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India is a multicultural liberal democratic state. It is also a poor, overpopulated 
Third World country. Many modernization theorists have assumed that these two 
descriptors were at odds, or at least sequentially determined with economic 
development a necessary pre-condition for democracy, and hence predicted the 
failure of the Indian experiment because of its ‘fissiparous tendencies’ (Harrison 
1960). More contemporary comparative political scientists have attempted more 
sophisticated and nuanced explanations of the Indian experiment than what 
modernization theorists offered (see, e.g., Mitra 2001). Also recently political 
theorists have increasingly turned their attention to multiculturalism (see, e.g., 
Parekh 2000). In this paper, I use a particular type of accommodation made by the 
Indian state to cultural diversity, constitutionally prescribed in the Sixth Schedule 
for parts of Assam but increasingly applied elsewhere in the northern stretches of 
Indian territory, to investigate contributions of recent liberal theory to 
understanding India’s multiculturalism. 
 One of the most prominent political theorists in recent times in the West is Will 
Kymlicka, who weds multiculturalism to liberalism in his liberal theory of minority 
rights. The mainstay of his theory is his distinction between national minorities and 
immigrant ethnic groups. Through this distinction he describes and prescribes 
accommodations made by the liberal state to cultural diversity. Although he admits 
that there are gray areas or ‘hard cases’ that challenge his categorization, his 
‘approach’ has been ‘to draw clear lines in muddy waters’ (Kymlicka 1997: 72). 
Can Kymlickian lines be drawn in the sediment-filled streams flowing down from 
the Himalayas? Do Kymlicka’s categories, and, more generally, his theory help us 
understand India’s liberal multiculturalism as practiced in the Himalayan foothills 
of north India? 
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K Y M L I C K A  T R A V E L S  T O  I N D I A  
 
For Kymlicka, national minorities are ‘territorially concentrated cultures’ that have 
been historically ‘incorporated’ into a larger nation-state. In contrast, ‘ethnic 
groups’, in Kymlicka’s schema, result from ‘individual and familial immigration’ 
(1995:10). Kymlicka argues that his two categories of national minorities and 
immigrant ethnic groups have practical relevance for liberal democratic states: 
‘differential treatment of immigrants and national minorities [...] is a well-
established feature of liberal democracies’ (1997: 73). This differential treatment is 
grounded in the rights discourse of liberalism. National minorities have the right to 
self-determination, according to the Wilsonian liberal tradition that Kymlicka 
admires. Immigrant ethnic groups, on the other hand, are usually granted 
‘polyethnic rights’ or perhaps even ‘special representation rights’ by the liberal 
state. Polyethnic rights would include, for example, government funding for 
privately practiced cultural or religious beliefs; special representation rights would 
be some kind of quota affirmative action or what is known in India as reservations 
policy. 
 Polyethnic and special representation rights are indeed familiar features of 
Western liberal democracies. As Kymlicka (1989) notes, liberal democracies 
usually have no problem with temporary special representation rights or polyethnic 
rights in the private sphere; however, they may be quite reluctant to grant self-
determination rights. This does not appear to be the case in India. In India, for 
reasons to be explored in this paper, the liberal state seems to be more willing to 
grant self-determination rights than polyethnic rights in the ‘hard cases’ of the 
Himalayas. 
 India grants self-government rights to certain minority groups through 
provisions of the Sixth Schedule of its constitution. These provisions allow for the 
establishment of ‘autonomous councils’. Originally designed for the Naga region 
of Assam, autonomous councils have more recently been established in Darjeeling 
and Ladakh, as well as regions in addition to the Naga area in the Northeast and 
elsewhere. The Jharkhand autonomous council has already evolved into statehood 
in the Indian federal union, and in Uttarakhand a contemplated autonomous council 
was bypassed in favor of statehood. After briefly discussing the original 
autonomous council provisions, I will focus on Darjeeling, where the first 
autonomous council outside of Assam was established in 1988, and on 
Uttarakhand. 
The siting of autonomous councils insinuates the historical incorporation of 
territorially concentrated cultures. Autonomous councils are all on the borderlands 
of the Indian nation-state. They are all in areas that under British colonial rule 
were, to use colonial terminology, ‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ areas along 
the ‘frontiers’ of the British empire. Darjeeling and Uttarakhand are in the 
Himalayas, the former just east of Nepal and the latter just west of Nepal. Even 
someplace like Jharkhand which today appears to be well in the interior of India 
was the South West Frontier Agency in 1833, given that Bengal was the colonial 
center at the time. By ‘excluded’ the British meant ‘non-regulated’ (a term used 
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prior to ‘excluded’), in terms of the Raj’s regulations and administration. Upon 
independence, the Constituent Assembly heatedly debated the wisdom of retaining 
these colonial exclusions – but they were retained, renamed as ‘scheduled areas’ 
(Sonntag 1999). Scheduled areas, the constitutional designation for granting self-
government rights, are as much a feature of the post-colonial state as they are of the 
liberal state. 
The ‘schedule’ in ‘scheduled areas’ refers to the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of 
the Indian Constitution, both of which address accommodation of ‘tribals’. At the 
Constituent Assembly, there was intense discussion and disagreement between 
assimilationists, who argued for only polyethnic and special representation rights 
for tribals, and Nehruvian liberals who argued for self-government rights. The 
compromise was that the Sixth Schedule would grant self-government, originally 
limited to the Nagas in Assam. The Fifth Schedule was for all other tribals; though 
it granted the tribals the right to participate in an (appointed) tribal advisory 
council, its main purpose was to establish special development zones in tribal 
areas. Its measures were considered temporary with the ultimate goal being tribal 
assimilation into the mainstream. The Fifth Schedule granted what Kymlicka 
would define as special representation associated with polyethnic rights, rights that, 
in Kymlicka’s scheme, are meant to be temporary and to enable integration and 
assimilation. The Sixth Schedule, in contrast, recognized permanent self-governing 
rights. 
Given the contrasting rights granted in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules, are tribals 
‘national minorities’ or ‘ethnic groups’ in Kymlicka’s terms? The widely used 
Indian term for tribals is ‘adivasi’. It carries the connotation of aboriginal, living in 
geographically and topographically isolated areas (usually in forest-jungle areas). 
Tribal/adivasi also carries the connotation of being culturally different. These 
characteristics would suggest that they are national minorities, according to 
Kymlicka’s categorization. However, it seems to have been the degree of cultural 
difference that determined whether tribals fell under the Fifth or Sixth Schedule, at 
least when these constitutional provisions were initially conceived. Many in the 
Constituent Assembly appeared fixated on the head-hunting cultural traits of the 
Nagas, willingly granting the Nagas self-government rather than risking their own 
heads by forcing assimilation (Sonntag 1999: 420). For other tribals such as those 
in Jharkhand, who were at least superficially just as different as the Nagas (minus 
the head-hunting), the Constituent Assembly only granted temporary measures 
under the Fifth Schedule to facilitate assimilation. In other words, tribals who were 
at the cultural margins (e.g., headhunters) were most likely to be granted self-
government. One non-Naga adivasi member of the Constituent Assembly 
complained that he was expected to don native garb and brandish a spear if he was 
to be considered a tribal by his colleagues.1 
Not only were the Nagas culturally ‘far out’, but they were also geographically 
peripheral. Assam is located to the north and northeast of Bangladesh (formerly 
East Pakistan), sandwiched between Bhutan, China (Tibet) and Burma. It was and 
                                                 
1 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, 995 [5th September 1949]; Jaipal Singh. 
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still is at the outer limits of the Indian nation-state. Ironically, in addition to being 
head-hunters, the Nagas were apparently skilled negotiators: Some members of the 
Constituent Assembly referred to the delicate negotiations between the Nagas and 
the new Indian state, with the Nagas threatening to join Tibet or Burma if not 
granted self-government (Sonntag 1999: 420). Although Kymlicka dismisses deal-
cutting as an anomaly in liberal accommodations of minorities (for example, with 
the Amish or Hasidic Jews in the United States), the Indian case here suggests that 
it may be more central than Kymlicka acknowledges. 
India’s initial reasons for granting self-government rights appear at odds with 
Kymlicka’s theory. Self-government rights were established, but only in the Sixth 
Schedule, limited to a portion of Assam, and probably because of fear (of those 
head-hunting Nagas). At least initially, then, the liberal Indian government didn’t 
treat its tribals consistently and in some cases not even differently from the 
allegedly assimilable polyethnic groups, despite Kymlicka’s insistence that liberal 
governments do so but liberal theorists just don’t acknowledge it (Kymlicka 1997: 
74).  
 
D a r j e e l i n g  
 
The extension of self-government through autonomous councils outside of Assam 
beginning in the 1980s casts further doubt on the applicability of Kymlicka’s 
categories to India. As mentioned above, Darjeeling was the first area outside of 
Assam in which an autonomous council was established. Although this was a 
‘partially excluded’ area under the British Raj, it is not a tribal area. Some groups 
are supposedly autochthonous (such as the Bhotia and Lepchas) and therefore 
could be, and sometimes are, considered adivasis, albeit Tibeto-Burman. Other, 
non-adivasi, Tibeto-Burman groups, such as Tamangs, Magars, Gurungs, Sherpas, 
Rai and Limbu, form the majority of the population. Along with the Indo-Aryan 
Khas Chettris, these groups all make up the ‘Gorkhalis’ of the region.2 The region 
was incorporated into the British Raj in the early 19th century, a ‘gift’ from 
independent Nepal. By being ‘historical incorporated’, the population would fit 
into Kymlicka’s category of national minority. However, many Gorkhalis migrated 
to the region during the British Raj to work on the tea plantations. They are 
therefore ethnic groups, according to Kymlicka’s categorization. There is no 
distinction made in Darjeeling between those who were incorporated, i.e., those 
who form a national minority in Kymlicka’s terms, and those who migrated, i.e., 
those who are ethnic. Already we are presented with a problem in using 
Kymlicka’s categories. 
When we move from categories of minorities to categories of demands in 
Kymlicka’s framework, the problems do not resolve themselves. What unites the 
Gorkhalis is the Nepali language, used as the lingua franca and regarded as a 
cultural marker to be protected and enhanced. Joined by Nepali speakers in Sikkim, 
agitation for recognition of the Nepali language in the Darjeeling area resulted in 
                                                 
2 Not incorporated in the Gorkhali identity are Dalits such as the Rajbhansi, as well as 
migrant tribals from primarily the Jharkhand region and Bengalis. 
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December 1992 in Nepali being added to the Eighth Schedule, the constitutional 
clause listing major languages of India.3 According to Kymlicka, national 
minorities have the right to protect and enhance their language, even through 
imposing restrictions on the use of other languages, as in Quebec for example. 
More commonly, however, demands for language rights are ‘polyethnic’ demands 
according to Kymlicka, i.e., the type of demand made by ethnic groups (e.g., 
mother-tongue instruction in primary grades, access to native tongue in courts). In 
either case, Kymlicka assumes that the national minority or the ethnic group is 
demanding rights for its language. That is because he assumes that culturally 
distinct minorities have their own distinct language. Nepali is an Indo-Aryan 
language, the mother tongue of the locally dominant Chettris. Here we have 
Tibeto-Burman groups identifying with a language from a completely different 
language family and demanding rights for that language. What is being created in 
the process is a pan-ethnic identity based on the Nepali language. It is an identity 
that is socially constructed in opposition to the dominant Bengali culture of the 
state of West Bengal, in which Darjeeling is located. In nearby Nepal, these same 
Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups have been rejecting the Indo-Aryan Nepali language 
in recent years as democratic political space opens for voicing opposition (Sonntag 
1995). This suggests that the social construction of identity may be a better 
indicator of the demands put forth than the type of minority as defined by 
Kymlicka.4   
The primary demand of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), which 
led the frequently violent agitation in the Darjeeling area for most of the 1980s, 
wasn’t for language, but for citizenship rights. Citizenship rights are Kymlicka’s 
quintessential ‘polyethnic demand’, desired by immigrant groups but eschewed by 
national minorities who, according to Kymlicka, usually don’t want to be part of 
the nation-state in which they find themselves. Ironically, this ‘polyethnic demand’ 
by the GNLF led to the granting of self-government in Darjeeling, Kymlicka’s 
quintessential national minority demand! In the early 1980s, Nepali-speaking tea-
plantation workers in Assam and further east were being expelled by ‘sons of the 
soil’ movements. Darjeeling Nepali-speakers’ sense of insecurity was heightened 
by the plight of these Nepali-speaking refugees from the east (Datta 1993: 150-51). 
In expressing politically their insecurity, the GNLF focused on Clause VII of the 
1950 India-Nepal treaty, which the GNLF saw as ‘an immediate danger for 
thousands of Nepalis to be dubbed “aliens”.’5 Clause VII states: ‘The Government 
of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one 
country in the territories of the other, the same privileges in the matter of residence, 
ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other 
privileges of a similar nature.’ In short, Nepalis living in India had residency rights 
but not citizenship rights. This, the leader of the GNLF, Subash Ghising, argued, 
opened the door to expulsion and exclusion as had happened to the Nepali-speakers 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of Eighth Schedule languages, see Gupta, Abbi, and Aggarwal (1995). 
4 If Kymlicka talked about French and joual in Quebec, he might be able to draw parallels 
during his travels to Darjeeling. 
5 ‘Disputed Clause’ (1986: 45). See also Government of West Bengal (1986: 17). 
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further east of Darjeeling: ‘We are not bona fide citizens of India; life and future is 
not secure for us here’.6 Ghising wanted citizenship rights for Nepali speakers who, 
according to him, were not ‘Nepalese’, the term implying loyalty to and citizenship 
of Nepal, but were ‘Gorkhas’. This latter term for Nepali speakers was popularized 
by the British as the designation for the ‘brave’ soldiers from the Himalayas in the 
Indian army, and is derived from the Gorkha Valley west of Kathmandu where the 
Nepalese dynasty was founded in the 18th century.7  
Why, then, if polyethnic demands were being made, did the GNLF end up with 
self-government in the form of an autonomous council being established in 1988? 
In addition to the problems with the application of Kymlicka’s categories in 
offering an explanation, we must also pay more attention than Kymlicka does to 
the politics surrounding such demands. The establishment of the Darjeeling Gorkha 
Hill Council (DGHC) and the continuing debate over devolution of power to the 
council have much to do with the political antics between the Centre, dominated by 
the Congress party in the 1980s, and the West Bengal state government, the bastion 
of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). It has been said that Rajiv Gandhi, 
Prime Minister in the late 1980s when the DGHC was established, ‘used Ghising as 
a stick to beat West Bengal [CPI(M)] Chief Minister Jyoti Basu’ (‘Encounter’ 
1992: 6). Ghising himself was recognized as politically astute with his ‘dual 
strategy of adopting a soft line toward the Congress(I)-ruled Centre and a tough 
posture against the CPI(M)-led West Bengal Government’ (‘Ghisingh’s Games’ 
1988: 28). In this triangulation of power plays, deals were made and unmade 
(despite Kymlicka’s dismissal of deals as anomalies). 
 
U t t a r a k h a n d  
 
Surely the most glaring anomaly in India to Kymlicka’s categories and theory is 
what transpired in the Himalayan region of Uttar Pradesh in the 1980s. Again, the 
political context provides explanatory background. While Jyoti Basu and the 
CPI(M) remained in power in West Bengal in the 1990s, Congress(I)’s hold on 
power at the Centre had been usurped initially by the left (1996-8) and more 
recently by the BJP, the Hindu nationalist right-wing party. These power dynamics 
at the Centre and in the states explain the momentum toward granting statehood to 
Uttarakhand, bypassing earlier proposals for an autonomous council for the region. 
Uttarakhand is BJP territory. By severing it from the plains region of the state of 
Uttar Pradesh, where left and lower-caste parties tend to dominate, the BJP stood to 
gain. 
In the mid-1990s, there was ‘fire in the hills’ of northern Uttar Pradesh fueled 
by violent demonstrations, agitations, and police reprisals (including rape) 
(Ramakrishnan 1994). The catalyst for the conflict was the implementation by the 
                                                 
6 Subash Ghising, quoted in Government of West Bengal (1986: 18). 
7 The nomenclature issue also surfaced in disputes over what to call the language of the 
region for its inclusion in the Eighth Schedule.  As noted above, the battle for inclusion 
finally succeeded in 1992, with Sikkimese politicians taking the lead. Their preferred 
nomenclature of ‘Nepali’ won out over Ghising’s preference for ‘Gorkhali’. 
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Uttar Pradesh Samajwadi (Socialist) Party government of a 27% reservations 
policy for backward castes in state education. The state already had implemented, 
as had all of India, dating back to the 1950s, special representation rights (to use 
Kymlicka’s terminology for reservations) for Dalits in education and employment. 
The late 1980s, early 1990s had seen political impetus to extend these 
representation rights to backward castes. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (UP), 
Mulayam Singh Yadav of the Samajwadi Party, had popular support for this in the 
plains of the state where backward castes (such as Yadavs) predominate. However, 
in northern UP, where the plains give way to the Himalayas, upper castes form the 
overwhelming majority of the population. Despite being upper caste, the people in 
this Himalayan region of Uttarakhand are quite poor and illiterate. Indeed, lack of 
economic development has been the prevalent problem in the past. As a result, the 
area suffers from severe out-migration, as most men leave to the plains to find 
employment (Mawdsley 1997a).  
In response to Mulayam Singh Yadav’s reservation policy, the Uttarakhandis 
demanded a separate reservation quota for the region, more reflective of the 
demographic make-up. The state government refused (Pande 1995: 48). As 
frustration mounted, violence erupted and demands escalated – from repeal of the 
27% quota to autonomy for Uttarakhand. 
For Kymlicka, Uttarakhand would indeed be a ‘hard case’. In Kymlicka’s 
framework, the Uttarakhandis might well be classified as a national minority. The 
inhabitants of the area claim a separate culture based on telluric distinctiveness: 
survival in the mountainous terrain allegedly breeds a different kind of folk. This is 
the region, after all, of the famous Chipko movement.  The area was annexed by the 
British from Nepal in the early 1800s, with parts of it remaining excluded up until 
the 1920s (Trivedi 1995; Keith 1937). Furthermore, the Uttarakhandis would 
probably qualify for self-government rights under Kymlicka’s scheme because of 
the severe out-migration from the region for wage labor in the plains. This 
threatens the cultural context in which Uttarakhandis can exercise personal 
autonomy, the latter being the foundation of liberalism (as discussed below).  
But in terms of caste, the Uttarakhandis are part of a privileged minority. 
Indeed, their demands for self-government stemmed from their opposition to 
special representation rights for the underprivileged. The application of Kymlicka’s 
theory in this case seems to lead to a perversion: the granting of minority rights to 
upper-caste Hindus in India. 
 
 
L I B E R A L  N A R R A T I V E S  I N  T H E  H I M A L A Y A S  
 
The cases presented above suggest that Kymlicka’s categories aren’t very useful or 
applicable to the Indian Himalayas. Kymlicka’s liberal narrative, originally 
developed for the Canadian context, doesn’t appear to be transnational. The 
problem is not only one of Kymlicka’s analytical categories but also, more 
fundamentally, of his underlying theoretical premises. Categories are not empirical 
realities but rather a method to concretize perceived relations among things, 
 
SELMA K. SONNTAG 8 
relations that are often unenunciated except through the naming of categories. 
What are Kymlicka’s unenunciated assumptions that inform his categories? We 
need to uncover the thematic informing Kymlicka’s categories—that is, the 
justificatory principles establishing relations that allow Kymlicka to derive his 
categories.  
Kymlicka’s categories derive from his arguments about why liberal 
governments should, and do, grant self-government rights to national minorities but 
not to ethnic groups. Kymlicka argues that liberal states should facilitate personal 
autonomy, defined as the ability of the individual to reflect upon and make choices 
about the good life. As a multiculturalist, Kymlicka adds that such choices are only 
meaningful in a cultural context. The liberal notion of a completely unencumbered 
individual is non-existent in practice. In practical terms, there is no such thing as a 
culturally unencumbered individual.   
Kymlicka’s acknowledgement of the importance of cultural context stops far 
short of the cultural determinism espoused by communitarians. For 
communitarians, the cultural context is foundational from which individualism may 
be derived, at least in Western cultures. Kymlicka remains a liberal. For him, the 
self-reflecting individual is foundational. The individual exercises personal 
autonomy in a cultural context. But that capacity for autonomy, for choice and self-
reflection, is independent of the cultural context. In this regard, Kymlicka is a 
minimalist. According to Geoffrey Levey, ‘Kymlicka tends to conceive of 
autonomy simply in terms of an individual’s capacity to choose’ (Levey 1997: 
235).8  In contrast, a Lockean liberal assumes that reason dictates an individual’s 
choice. Furthermore, most liberals assume that rational choice is a universal human 
trait. For Kymlicka, the question of whether an individual’s capacity to choose is 
rational, hence whether ‘reason’ is universal or particular to Western tradition, 
should be decided at the end of the day, after debate and reflection and not a priori 
(Kymlicka 1989: chap. 4). 
Liberals who posit reason as informing individuals’ choice of the good life can 
easily and effortlessly extrapolate to justify the liberal state. Liberal institutions are 
derivative of the Lockean concept of human nature because of its presupposition of 
the individual being endowed with reason. Liberal institutions are the choice of 
rational autonomous individuals, as liberals see it. The collective nature of the 
choice can be resolved by the Habermasian liberal, who would emphasize the 
consensual, dialogical contract through which liberals establish political 
institutions. Liberalism’s critics, such as Uday Mehta, argue that this Habermasian 
contract is itself a liberal institution that doesn’t necessarily follow from Lockean 
assumptions (Mehta 1997: 65). Mehta argues, using Locke’s Thoughts on 
Education, that liberals assume, without problematizing, that individuals are 
socialized into ‘reason’. This necessary socialization through education refutes any 
                                                 
8 Levey frets over Kymlicka’s ‘anything goes’ minimalism and attempts to resolve it by 
creating more categories rather than pinning the problem on authenticity, as I do further on 
here. Levey correctly but briefly raises the authenticity question in his article immediately 
after his characterization of Kymlicka just quoted, noting that problems occur when there is 
‘doubt about the authenticity of a person’s preferences’, but then quickly notes that ‘[t]hese 
points raise complex issues beyond the scope of the present inquiry’ (Levey 1997: 235). 
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universal claim, since reason has to be learned. Learning, Carlos Forment (1996) 
points out, is the basis for exclusion: Learners, i.e., those who have yet to learn or 
are in the process of learning, are excluded from being ‘choosers’, those who by 
virtue of reason can exercise personal autonomy. Hence, as Mehta argues, ‘the 
exclusionary basis of liberalism derive[s] from its theoretical core’; that is, 
‘liberalism has been exclusionary and [...] in this it manifests an aspect of its 
theoretical underpinning and not merely an episodic compromise with the practical 
constraints of implementation’ (1997: 61). Bhikhu Parekh similarly notes that 
‘[t]he contradiction [in liberalism] is not just between liberal thought and practice, 
but within liberal thought itself’ (1995: 82).  
Kymlicka would agree with Mehta that the liberal minimalism he espouses 
doesn’t necessarily lead to liberal institutions. Indeed, Kymlicka doesn’t even 
assume universal reason as a foundation from which to derive liberal institutions. 
In this regard, he gives ground to liberalism’s critics. But, as with his giving 
ground to the communitarians in regard to the cultural context of personal 
autonomy, this places him in a conceptual conundrum. Although, according to 
Kymlicka, liberal institutions are not derivative of (rational) personal choice, the 
reverse does hold: liberal institutions guarantee the ability to act upon self-
reflection, i.e., to choose. Not only is this true, but also desirable; Kymlicka 
insinuates that his theory has policy implications that liberal governments can 
follow. Liberal governments should set up liberal institutions which will foster the 
individual’s capacity to choose. Since liberal institutions and cultural context are 
necessary for individual/personal autonomy, according to Kymlicka, it is 
imperative for liberal states to protect the cultural context of culturally distinct 
minorities. Protecting minority cultures is required for liberal states if self-
reflection for autonomous, minority individuals is to be meaningful. 
What if these two imperatives for the exercise of personal autonomy, i.e., 
liberal institutions and cultural context, conflict in practice?  In protecting minority 
cultural contexts, one might not end up with liberal institutions within that context. 
Choosing, i.e., exercising self-reflection, doesn’t guarantee liberal institutions, 
Kymlicka admits, as we saw above. And he frets over this – what to do with those 
illiberal communities that good liberals must tolerate? ‘Liberals in the majority 
group’, Kymlicka distresses, ‘have to learn to live with this [illiberalism in the 
minority community]’, though they should ‘provide [...] support’ to ‘any efforts the 
[minority] group makes to liberalize their culture’ (1995: 168). The stench of 
benevolent paternalism, so familiar to liberals, is strong here. Kymlicka distances 
himself from what he calls ‘paternalistic colonialism’ where liberal principles were 
imposed by force (1995: 167). Instead, Kymlicka prefers non-coercive methods 
(e.g., support, encouragement, role-modeling). Only when the illiberal practices are 
truly offensive, such as wife-beating, is intervention by the liberal majority called 
for. But in most cases, the illiberal minority community can learn to be, or be 
socialized into becoming, liberal. 
With this argument, Kymlicka is confronted with a conundrum. Above we saw 
how liberalism’s critics, such as Mehta and Forment, suggest that learning and 
socialization, as necessary practices of liberalism, are exclusionary. However, 
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Kymlicka is in effect saying that liberalism isn’t exclusionary because, after all, a 
liberal state wouldn’t/shouldn’t/doesn’t exclude illiberal minority cultures. 
Kymlicka laments that despite majoritarian liberal institutions, illiberalism may 
occur in minority cultures. Where does this illiberalism come from then? Since 
Kymlicka would never suggest that liberalism itself might foster illiberal cultures, 
the illiberalism must come from somewhere else. Accordingly, there must be 
cultures (and individuals for that matter) ‘outside’ of liberalism. According to 
Kymlicka’s reasoning, it isn’t because liberalism ‘excludes’ that these 
communities/individuals are outside of liberalism (as Mehta and Forment might 
argue). They therefore must be outside because of something else. For Kymlicka 
that something else is cultural distinctiveness which translates into claims of (both 
cultural and personal) authenticity. Kymlicka assumes that illiberal national 
minorities are authentic.9 That is, they are/have been ‘insulated’ (1995: 164). Their 
culture is ‘thick’. ‘[A]s a culture is liberalized,’ explains Kymlicka, ‘the resulting 
cultural identity becomes both “thinner” and less distinctive’ (1995: 87). Less 
distinctive means less authentic, and therefore less illiberal. Assuming the 
authenticity of national minority cultures as the source of illiberalism absolves 
liberalism and liberals of responsibility and justifies liberal hegemony. This was 
the justification Mill gave, Kymlicka admits, for colonialism. 
But what if illiberalism is caused by liberalism, rather than by ‘authenticity’? 
What if liberalism reproduces its other, its alterity – to justify itself? Then the 
‘source’ of illiberalism wouldn’t be external to, but rather internal to, liberalism. 
Kymlicka claims that the Pueblo Indians in the United States are illiberal because 
they disbar membership to the offspring of tribal women who marry outside the 
tribe (1995: 164-65). Were marriage and tribal membership even issues in 
‘authentic’, i.e., pre-contact, Pueblo culture (see, e.g., Minow 1995: 359)? 
Marriage and citizenship are liberal institutions – the quintessential contracts.  How 
do we know that it wasn’t the introduction of liberal institutions that provoked the 
illiberalism?  
As noted above, many liberals derive liberal institutions from the presumed 
universal premises of liberal theory. But a liberal theory that truly has any pretense 
of being universal must be so minimal that there is no theoretical guarantee of it 
emanating liberal institutions. Hence Kymlicka’s minimalism. Yet, in the end, 
Kymlicka, like Locke, must introduce a more expansive definition of capacity to 
choose and the exercise of personal autonomy through learning/socialization. This 
‘learning’ may guarantee liberal institutions but it means forsaking any claim to 
universality. In forsaking universality, the criteria for distinguishing liberal from 
illiberal practices become culturally specific. Practices that evolve in reaction to the 
imposition of liberal institutions could thusly be defined as illiberal. Whereas 
Kymlicka would argue that the ‘source’ of this illiberalism is an ‘authentic’ culture, 
the source might actually be the imposition of (western liberal) culture-specific 
criteria for evaluating practices. 
                                                 
9 Kymlicka makes the same argument for what he perceives to be illiberal sovereign states. 
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Kymlicka’s liberalism, then, assumes authentic national minority cultures that 
need to be tolerated and preserved (up to a point) by liberal governments, in order 
for individuals in that minority culture to exercise personal autonomy.10 Anthony 
Appiah (1994) worries that such an appeal to authenticity facilitates essentializing. 
Those making the appeal assume that there must be some authentic essence to 
those (illiberal) insulated cultures. It is often this ‘essence’ then that liberals seek to 
preserve rather than the cultural context. Appiah warns that this might just ‘replace 
one kind of tyranny with another’ by demanding a show of authenticity in order to 
achieve recognition and minority rights (1994: 163). This was indeed the case for 
tribals at the Constituent Assembly as we saw above: Authenticity (easily 
identifiable by illiberal head-hunting) was the determinant of the granting of self-
government.  
Kymlicka maintains that only national minorities have the right to self-
government. This is because Kymlicka assumes their culture is authentic; it is 
‘thick’. Other minority cultures such as those of immigrant ethnic groups are less 
authentic. Hence, ethnic groups don’t pose the same problem for Kymlicka because 
their culture is already ‘thin’. Ethnic groups ‘take the larger political community 
for granted, and seek greater inclusion in it’ (Kymlicka 1995: 181). They want to 
and do assimilate – ‘assimilation [being] the cardinal sin against the ideal of 
authenticity’ (Taylor 1994: 38). Their ‘thin’ cultures aren’t necessary for providing 
meaningful context to choices. Individuals belonging to ethnic groups can exercise 
personal autonomy, i.e., make choices, within the dominant cultural context. 
Therefore immigrants can’t get away with illiberal practices in Kymlicka’s scheme. 
Indeed the liberal state is legitimate in ‘compel[ling] respect for liberal principles’ 
from immigrant ethnic groups (Kymlicka 1995: 170). At the end of the day, 
Kymlicka ends up with ‘authentic’, preservable cultures (national minorities) and 
‘thin’ cultures not necessary for liberalism to preserve (ethnic groups). This 
conclusion, however, is based on exclusion, as suggested above. Authentic cultures 
are perceived to be illiberal cultures, formed outside and independent of liberalism. 
In contrast, thin cultures are perceived to be assimilable, and hence more likely to 
be liberal. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Taylor (1994) comments on similar liberal assumptions about the authenticity of the 
individual. An authentic individual, critiques Taylor, today at least defines herself 
dialogically. There is no pristine authenticity anymore. Unfortunately, Taylor only briefly 
notes the analogy between authenticity at the individual level and authenticity at the 
cultural level (1994: 31). See Seglow (1998) for a more extensive discussion of individual 
versus cultural authenticity. Cosmopolitans such as Waldron (1995) explicitly reject the 
reality of cultural authenticity. But Waldron uses this rejection to attack the communitarian 
dimension of Kymlicka’s argument rather than the liberal dimension. Waldron is concerned 
to show that individuals don’t need just one cultural framework, and ignores the issue of 
‘accommodation of nonliberal minorities [which] represents such a conundrum for 
Kymlicka’ (Levey 1997: 231).  
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H I M A L A Y A N  E X C L U S I O N S  
 
Above I argued that in Kymlicka’s view, autonomy for national minorities is linked 
to and dependent on cultural ‘authenticity’, a ‘condition’, Kymlicka implies, 
existing ‘outside’ of liberalism. If the Kymlickian liberal state justifies self-
government on the basis of cultural exclusion, what does this imply for the Indian 
liberal state in terms of its accommodation of cultural minorities? Is the liberal 
narrative of exclusion, a narrative that Kymlicka doesn’t acknowledge but to which 
he nevertheless contributes, transnational?  
 Kymlicka implies that national minorities with ‘thick’ cultures want to be 
excluded:  ‘[d]emands for self-government [...] reflect a desire to weaken the 
bonds with the larger political community, and indeed question its very authority 
and permanence’ (Kymlicka 1995: 181). They claim an ‘inherent’ and ‘permanent’ 
right to self-government (Kymlicka 1995: 30). Self-government rights are desired 
by national minorities, but not desired by ethnic groups (Kymlicka 1995: 10, 97-
98). As we saw above, Kymlicka worries that these national minorities may not be 
liberal. We also noted how Kymlicka regards self-government as a liberal 
institution that guarantees autonomy. So, according to Kymlicka’s logic, illiberal 
groups naturally/inherently demand a liberal institution that will guarantee their 
autonomy so that the source of their illiberalism, i.e., their authentic culture, can 
survive. 
 In the Indian Himalayas, an inverted logic seems to be the modus operandi: by 
identifying cultures as authentic and culturally distinctive, the liberal state can 
declare them illiberal and hence candidates for exclusion. Concomitant to this 
exclusion, however, is the granting of (nominal) self-government. In Darjeeling, 
the ‘Gorkhalis’ demand inclusion only to be granted self-government which 
justifies their exclusion. The liberal state contends they need to be excluded 
because of their illiberal practices and the distinctiveness/authenticity of their 
culture. The state then backs up its contentions with its presentation of evidence. 
Hence, when the GNLF leader, Subash Ghising, spouts off admiration for Hitler, as 
he has done in the not-too-distant past, the West Bengal government frets about the 
problem of these minority types being illiberal and speculates about the need to 
rein them in – justifying the state government’s intransigence in devolving power 
to the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC). And, in the Naga case as we saw 
above, the illiberal head-hunting appeared to be the cultural practice that 
preoccupied the liberal Constituent Assembly. But how do we know that Naga 
head-hunting wasn’t a response to the imposition of the colonial and post-colonial 
liberal state and its institutions? 
The Indian liberal state goes to great lengths to establish the cultural 
distinctiveness of the areas granted self-government. In the case of Darjeeling, the 
West Bengal government emphasized the cultural distinctiveness/authenticity of 
the area in justifying (nominal) self-government: ‘[W]hile it is true that the 
constitutional provision [Sixth Schedule] presently applies only to tribal areas, this 
is precisely why an amendment [...] is being sought, in some specific situations, to 
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make it applicable to non-tribal areas with such culturally distinct minorities living 
in compact areas’ (Government of West Bengal 1986: 26; emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Uttarakhand, the portrayal of cultural distinctiveness went so far as to 
claim that upper-caste Hindus were tribals in a government report (Mawdsley 
1997b: 2229)!  
Why should the liberal state grant self-governance to minorities? In my re-
interpretation of Kymlicka’s liberal logic, the liberal state grants self-government 
to national minorities because this establishes borders, and borders exclude. 
Authentic, geographically concentrated cultures can be physically and culturally 
marked off by liberal borders. Both abstract and concrete markers of inclusion and 
exclusion are the hallmarks of the liberal state: 
 
Think of liberalism as a certain way of drawing the map of the social 
and political world. The [...] preliberal map showed a largely 
undifferentiated land mass, with rivers and mountains, cities and 
towns, but no borders. [...] Society was conceived as an organic and 
integrated whole. [...] Confronting this world, liberal theorists 
preached and practiced the art of separation. They drew lines, marked 
off different realms, and created the socio-political map with which 
we are still familiar. [...] Liberalism is a world of walls [...] 
(Walzer 1984: 315). 
 
Kymlicka’s approach does indeed ‘draw clear lines’ in the ‘muddy waters’ of the 
Himalayas, but only after revealing his unenunciated premises of exclusion.  
 Chantal Mouffe (1996) has argued that these exclusions are necessary for 
liberalism. It is the exclusions, the ‘constitutive outside’, that define liberalism. 
Liberalism is theoretically consistent, but its theory is not the one explicated by its 
theoreticians and practitioners. Rather its consistency and its power are visible 
through its own unacknowledged exclusions.  
 These exclusions, the ‘constitutive outside’, of liberalism are apparent in the 
Indian context. The Indian liberal democratic state grants self-government to 
certain groups by allowing these groups to establish autonomous councils. The 
location of autonomous councils and the designation of which groups are afforded 
councils by the state reveal the liberal state’s exclusions. These liberal exclusions, 
as outlined above, are premised on projecting authenticity onto assumed isolated, 
insulated cultures, and establishing borders in order to overcome the ‘cartographic 
anxiety’ (Krishna 1996) of the liberal nation-state. 
 Alternatively, we might then characterize self-government in the form of 
autonomous councils not as an accommodation to a national minority based on 
recognizing its inherent rights,11 but as a liberal projection that legitimizes the 
liberal core (i.e., the liberal democratic state) by demarcating the periphery 
                                                 
11 Martha Minow deftly argues that demanding a ‘right’ acknowledges and legitimizes 
liberalism rather than challenging it.  Although this is quite apparent with special 
representation and polyethnic rights, Minow implies that this applies even to self-
government demands (1995: 358-59). 
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culturally in terms of projecting authenticity, theoretically by projecting 
illiberalism, and institutionally by granting self-government. 
At the end of the day (or rather at the end of this paper), we can conclude that 
Kymlicka’s theory helps us understand India’s liberal multiculturalism, but not in 
the way that Kymlicka intended. Liberalism can accommodate multiculturalism, 
but not because of any transnational or trans-cultural, i.e., universal, premises 
inherent in liberal theory. Indian liberalism accommodates multiculturalism in the 
Himalayas through exclusion. In the process of excluding, the definition of who is 
included is negotiated (e.g., in the Constituent Assembly) and renegotiated (e.g., in 
the politics of extending the Sixth Schedule to new areas). The result is what Mitra 
(2001) calls ‘fuzzy multiculturalism’ or what I have referred to elsewhere as 
India’s capacity to ‘muddle through’ (Sonntag, 2003).  
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